

Bob Fischer

This book is an attempt to think through, carefully and consistently, the question of how we ought to treat nonhuman animals. In the process it exposes the prejudices that lie behind our present attitudes and behavior. In the chapters that describe what these attitudes mean in practical terms—how animals suffer from the tyranny of human beings—there are passages that will arouse some emotions. These will, I hope, be emotions of anger and outrage, coupled with a determination to do something about the practices described.

—FROM THE ORIGINAL PREFACE TO PETER SINGER'S
ANIMAL LIBERATION

Introduction

Let's assume that it's almost always wrong for people like me to eat meat. That is, let's assume that healthy Westerners who live well above the poverty line should, in virtually all circumstances, abstain from consuming animal flesh. And now let's note the obvious: most don't abstain, which means that most people act wrongly on a regular basis.¹ Moreover, it's implausible that these wrongs are excusable: most people eat meat because everyone else does; because it tastes good; because it's widely available and inexpensive; *not* because they need it to survive; *not* because beef lobbyists are holding guns to their respective heads; *not* because they are, unbeknownst to us, utility monsters whose gustatory preferences genuinely do deserve greater moral consideration than the interests of the animals they eat. Hence, most people who eat meat are blameworthy for doing so.

1. Throughout, "people" refers to people like me: healthy, Western, human animals who live well above the poverty line. Also, I should note that, throughout this paper, I'm going to call nonhuman animals "animals." This is only for convenience. In particular, it does not indicate that (a) I take there to be some morally important differences between nonhuman animals (as a gerrymandered class) and humans (as a less gerrymandered, but still somewhat gerrymandered class); (b) that I take no nonhuman animal to be a person; or (c) that I take all humans to be persons.

Nevertheless, we tend not to blame them. In general, we are unfazed by the dietary choices of others—and when they bother us, we rarely express as much. My aim here is to argue that this is as it should be, at least for the foreseeable future.

I won't contend that blame would be ineffective nor that our current practices represent the best way to promote the interests of animals. I have no idea whether these claims are true, and I take no stance on them here. Instead, my line is this:

1. If it would be unreasonable to demand that someone behave in a particular way, then, if she fails to behave that way, we shouldn't blame her for it.
2. It would be unreasonable to demand that someone abstain from eating meat.
3. So, if someone eats meat, we shouldn't blame her for it.

Call this *the argument against blaming the blameworthy*. I won't say much in defense of the argument's first premise. I assume that blame involves the negative reactive attitudes—anger, indignation, resentment, outrage, and so on—being directed toward a (perceived) moral offense. Granted, these emotions aren't always expressed. But if they're absent entirely, then I think you've got *judging to be blameworthy*, just plain *moral disapproval*, or some other response in that neighborhood.² Moreover, I follow Gary Watson in thinking that “[the] negative reactive attitudes express a *moral* demand, a demand for reasonable regard” (Watson 2004, p. 229). Given as much, the first premise is practically true by definition.

The argument turns, then, on the second premise. Here's a *précis* of the case for it. I'm a vegetarian because I'm moved by standard arguments for vegetarianism: I think the benefits of meat-eating don't outweigh the costs; I think that to consume animals is to fail to treat them as ends in themselves (and they deserve such treatment); I think eating meat is an expression of callousness. But these sorts of arguments generalize, which is to say that they don't merely cast a shadow on meat-eating, but on countless activities that are part and parcel of living in a modern consumer society: for example, spending money in ways that support exploitative labor practices, or investing energies

2. I acknowledge that strong negative reactive attitudes may not exhaust blame: it may have other dimensions, such as the judgment that *a* is responsible for *x*, or that *x* is a mark against *a*'s character. I take no stand on what those other dimensions may be.

in our hobbies instead of the homeless shelter. However, since it would be unreasonable to demand that people make each and every one of these changes, we have to reflect on which, if any, we can insist upon. When we do so, we find that meat-eating doesn't make the cut.

To be clear, my goal here is not to argue that meat-eating is morally permissible. It isn't. Nor am I arguing that we shouldn't encourage people to abstain from consuming animals. We should. I am just interested in whether, of the many possible responses to meat-eating, blame is the appropriate one. In most cases, I think it isn't.

Defending the Argument's Second Premise, Step 1

At issue is whether it's unreasonable to demand that someone abstain from eating meat. I assume that, if the many arguments against meat-eating are *unsuccessful*, then it certainly isn't. So let's suppose that those arguments *are* successful.³ What follows?

I think what follows is that much of what we do is morally wrong—not just with respect to animals. The most well-known argument against meat-eating, at least in philosophical circles, is probably the utilitarian one due to Peter Singer (Singer 2009; meat-eating fails to satisfy the expected interests of sentient beings, equally considered), followed closely by the rights-based argument due to Tom Regan (Regan 1983; animals have inherent value, and killing them for food treats them as mere resources). More recently, virtue-based arguments have become more prominent (Hursthouse 2000, 2011; Nobis 2002; Walker 2007; Kriegel 2013; these vary in their details, but are unified by a concern with what compassion requires of us). Moreover, there are a host of arguments based on commonsense moral principles

3. Someone might think that this claim is vulnerable to an obvious objection. *Suppose that utilitarian arguments against meat-eating work. Then, utilitarianism is true. If utilitarianism is true, then Kantianism is false. But if Kantianism is false, then Kantian arguments against meat-eating fail. Hence, if some arguments against meat-eating are successful, then others aren't.* There are two ways out. My preference is to reject the assumption that utilitarian and Kantian considerations are in competition with one another. I opt for a view where arguing for a moral position amounts to arguing that it's supported by an overlapping consensus of distinct kinds of moral reasons. However, if we prefer not to reject that assumption, then we can treat the antecedent as shorthand for a more careful claim: namely, that there is a set of arguments against meat-eating having compossible premises, and each of those arguments is sound. (Granted, it matters which set of arguments. For simplicity's sake, though, we can proceed as though it's one that includes an argument based on either utilitarianism, Kantianism, or virtue ethics.)

(Curnutt 1997; Engel 2001; Jordan 2001; Norcross 2004; Rachels 2004; DeGrazia 2009).⁴

It isn't contentious that some of these arguments generalize: the utilitarian argument is often criticized on just this point. But there is nothing special about that one. If the arguments against meat-eating work, then we cannot justify harming others, or violating their rights, or being callous toward their needs, simply because life is more pleasant if we do so. But we can harm others by ignoring them; we can violate their rights by participating in systems that exploit them; we can be callous toward them by pretending that the trivial interests of those near and dear outweigh the most pressing interests of those distant strangers. And these things we do—to animals, to humans—without thinking, day in and day out, in countless small ways. We drive when we could walk, which is worse for us, for the environment, and for the creatures that we are bound to hit with enough such excursions. We get the \$10 bottle of wine instead of the \$8 bottle (or the \$5 bottle instead of the box), though the difference will be imperceptible and the extra dollars could go to the shelter. We forget to vote despite the signs, we fail to protest, we tolerate systemic injustice. We spend lavishly on our families; we buy new when used would be as good; we opt for homes in suburbs instead of high rises, ignoring the ills of suburban sprawl. In general, our decisions serve our personal interests, however inconsequential they may be. We are complicit in great evil.

And if the arguments against meat-eating are successful, we're short on excuses. Consider, for example, an appeal to an individual's causal impotence, which might seem to mitigate moral responsibility. However, an individual's buying and eating a chicken breast has no bearing on the number of chickens killed, as her purchase is noise in the grocery store's inventory. If the arguments work, then this must not matter. Nor is ignorance an excuse: surely some people are unaware of the misery in concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) and slaughterhouses; if the arguments condemn these people, then what matters is the ease of access to relevant information, not whether we actually have it. (It's irresponsible not to know.) Finally, having to make minor sacrifices is no excuse: if these arguments work, then we might have to violate various social norms, revise much-loved traditions, learn new

4. Additionally, there are arguments that are based on human interests: for example, ones driven by concerns about distributive justice (Rachels 1977; Midgley 1984), environmental responsibility (Singer 2009, Chapter 4), health (Barnard and Kieswer 2004), and feminist critiques of the association between meat and masculinity (Adams 2010). I ignore these arguments here because I don't think that factoring them in would undermine the generalization thesis; moreover, I'm primarily interested in arguments based on the interests of animals.

skills, give up certain conveniences, and so on. But so it goes when your aim is to treat beings as ends in themselves; so it goes when your aim is to be compassionate.

So if the arguments against meat-eating are successful, then we should expect many features of modern life to be morally wrong. Let's call this *the generalization thesis*. Supposing that the arguments against meat-eating are successful, how does the generalization thesis bear on whether it's reasonable to demand that people abstain?

Defending the Argument's Second Premise, Step 2

The answer, I think, is that it shifts the burden of proof. I take it to be obvious that it would be unreasonable to demand that people make every change required by the generalized versions of the arguments against eating meat—not because the obligations aren't real, but because the life we can justify is so far from the one we actually live. Someone might concede as much, but maintain that we need no special reason to demand just a *single* change, as opposed to the whole lot. On this view, we don't need a reason that distinguishes one demand over others; we just need to avoid making every demand. This strikes me as akin to suggesting that, even though it would be unreasonable to demand that road users follow every law to the letter, it's reasonable to demand—without explanation—that cyclists come to a complete stop at every stop sign. The response seems utterly arbitrary. (It isn't enough to point out that, in fact, it's the law: that's a reason for the person to comply, not for us to insist that she comply.) So while it may be reasonable to demand that people make some change or other, we need further argument to show that it's reasonable to demand any particular one.

How might such an argument go? I see three strategies. The first is to emphasize the ease of abstaining. The second is to emphasize the severity of the wrong. The third is to limit the context.

The Ease of Abstaining

Someone might observe that it's just so easy to stop eating meat, and hence hard to think that we shouldn't demand abstinence. I gave up meat years ago, and I confess some sympathy with this thought. Still, it can't be right, and this because so many of the changes we could make are equally simple. You don't need to stop going out to eat and donate all the money you'd save; you just need to go to this slightly less expensive place, donating the difference. You

don't need to sell your car and bike everywhere to avoid accidental collisions with songbirds and squirrels; you just need to bike when the weather's good and your destination is within three miles. You don't need to go vegan; you just need to cut out eggs. And so on. There are countless small changes that we have moral reason to make, and that we may well be obliged to make if the arguments against meat-eating are successful. And we have means and opportunity to make them. So, we act wrongly when we don't revise our habits, which is to say that we act wrongly all the time. The problem with the objection is that it fails to see meat-eating in this context, and hence fails to see the implications of using ease of change as our guide to those demands that are reasonable.

The Severity of the Wrong

Precise estimates vary, but it's widely acknowledged that billions of land animals and tens of billions of aquatic animals are killed each year for US consumption alone.⁵ If it's wrong to kill and consume animals for food, then surely we are grappling with an enormous evil when we consider meat consumption. Does the severity of the wrong make it reasonable to demand abstinence from meat?

First, we should be wary of the way this is framed. No individual is *causally* responsible for national statistics regarding slaughter. (Indeed, when we consider the behavior of a single consumer, it isn't clear that she's causally responsible for *any* animal slaughter. For further discussion, see the essays by Driver, Budolfson, and Littlejohn in this volume.) Second, whatever our account of complicity, it shouldn't entail that an individual is morally responsible for national statistics regarding slaughter. Whatever responsibility attaches to the individual, it's got to be less than the above suggests.

Second, and as before, it's important to contextualize the wrong relative to all others. What we do to animals *is* terrible, to be sure. But so are many *other* things we do. It's *very bad* that so many people are still suffering and dying from preventable diseases; it's *very bad* that the contemporary West has, in effect, made indentured servants of developing countries; it's *very bad* that most of us can't be bothered to address systemic racial injustices in our own communities. Moreover, we've got better grounds for being

5. For the USDA's numbers (which don't include fish), see <http://www.nass.usda.gov/>. For the UN's global numbers (which include all species), see the *FAO Statistical Yearbook*, available here: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3107e/i3107e03.pdf>.

incensed by these injustices than we do the injustices faced by animals. Human societies have come a long way toward affirming human rights and the equal worth of human persons. Hence, it's especially appalling that we're so far from realizing these ideals. By contrast, most human societies are just beginning to give serious moral consideration to the animals we raise for food. (The rest aren't even doing that.) So, while our treatment of animals is gravely disappointing, it isn't at all surprising. Hence, the severity of the wrong is mitigated—at least with respect to what it's reasonable to demand—by the moral commitments of those to be confronted. The point here is not that eating an animal is less significant than other wrongs. Rather, it's that we wanted an argument for thinking that abstaining from meat-eating stands out among the various changes that people ought to make, that it's reasonable to ask for this change over others. I'm contending that this isn't obviously so.

Limiting the Context

The third way to argue that it's reasonable to demand that people change their diets is to limit the context. Perhaps it would be unreasonable to demand that strangers alter their behavior. Still, someone might argue, we can demand that our friends change; we can push our loved ones to do right by animals.

I think this is correct, but we shouldn't overstate its significance. Perhaps I can reasonably demand that my friend, the lapsed vegan, get back on the wagon. But it doesn't follow from this that I can demand the same from my brother, who has never shared the relevant ethic. It isn't enough to have *standing* to make demands, as we often do with respect to kith and kin; we have to have standing to make that *particular* demand.

At this juncture, the right move is to combine strategies. "Granted," someone might say, "it would be unreasonable to make demands of strangers. But we can reasonably demand that those near and dear become vegetarians, given both the ease of giving up meat and the severity of the wrong involved in consuming it."

I think this move fares no better. Consider a parallel line of reasoning: "Granted, it would be unreasonable to make demands of strangers. But we can reasonably demand that those near and dear give up dining at restaurants, redirecting that money to causes that desperately need it. After all, it's easy to give up dining out, and there are many evils we perpetuate by not giving." Again, the goal is to distinguish meat-eating from the other changes we might demand. And so far, we have not identified distinguishing features.

Defending the Argument's Second Premise, Step 3

If the arguments in the last two sections are sound, then we have yet to find a reason to demand abstaining from meat that doesn't apply equally well to a whole host of morally important changes. Since it would be unreasonable to demand them all and arbitrary to demand just one, this means we haven't yet found a reason to demand abstinence.

This raises an important question: what *would* it be reasonable to demand? I doubt we'll get a clean distinction between those norms where insisting on compliance would and wouldn't be reasonable. More realistically, we can hope to develop a very rough ranking of norms based on various considerations: those in the highest group will be the ones where it's clearly reasonable to express anger when people fail to comply with them; those in the lowest will be the ones where it clearly isn't reasonable. To this end, I propose five guidelines:

1. It's easier to justify demanding compliance when failure to comply with a norm somehow threatens our shared life. That is, when failure to comply undermines mutually beneficial cooperative activity, it's easier to justify expressing anger about the failure.
2. It's easier to justify demanding compliance when there's already widespread compliance. This is evidence that the compliance is within the person's capacity, that it isn't overly burdensome.
3. It's easier to justify demanding compliance when the violator endorses the norm in question. This allows us to borrow the violator's authority (at least insofar as the violator wouldn't want to resolve the inconsistency either by embracing it or by rejecting the norm that gave rise to it).
4. It's easier to justify demanding compliance when the norm in question is easy to apply. In part, this is because this feature makes it less plausible that the violation can be explained away as an accident.
5. It's easier to justify demanding compliance when we can be quite confident in identifying failures to comply, thereby lowering the risk of a false accusation.⁶

To see how we might deploy these considerations, let's think about theft. Is it reasonable to demand that people not steal? Absolutely. First,

6. These considerations are loosely based on the ones that J. O. Urmson proposes—for quite different purposes—in Urmson (1958, pp. 211ff.). Urmson's goal is to defend a distinction between duty and the supererogatory, and he argues for a conception of morality that serves "man as he is and as he can be expected to become, not man as he would be if he were perfectly rational or an incorporeal angel" (1958, p. 210). As it happens, I have little sympathy with that project. For challenges to Urmson, see Singer (1972), Pybus (1982), Kagan (1989), and Unger (1996).

non-compliance undermines various aspects of our shared life: in addition to the obvious material losses, it also undermines trust, forcing us to redirect energy from constructive projects to security measures. Second, compliance is indeed widespread (at least in societies where there are reasonable opportunities for securing the means of existence through licit channels), so we have reason to think that we aren't asking too much. Third, the norm in question is one that we can expect people to endorse; we all want to claim a right to control our property, and we all enjoy the goods that compliance makes available to us both individually and collectively. Fourth, the relevant rule—"Don't take what doesn't belong to you"—is not unmanageably complex. And fifth, we can often be quite confident about failures of compliance, at least when the perpetrator is in possession of the goods in question. In this context, demands are completely reasonable.

By contrast, consider the imperative to abandon your projects and devote your life to the needs of malnourished children in the developing world. Presumably, even if we think we ought to do this (as I often do), we don't think it would be reasonable to demand this of others. And the above considerations explain why. First, our failure to do this doesn't undermine some aspect of our shared life together (where, again, "we" are healthy Western people who live well above the poverty line). Second, there certainly isn't widespread compliance. Third, most people don't endorse the norm. Still, the imperative does quite well on the fourth and fifth considerations: while it isn't easy to specify what compliance involves, we do have a fairly good sense of what it would mean to be in the ballpark; and, if nothing else, it's pretty easy to identify what it *doesn't* involve. So, we can be quite sure that failure to comply isn't accidental, and that we aren't misattributing responsibility. However, it's plain that these virtues don't trump the other vices. Perhaps the most natural way to make sense of this is to understand the fourth and fifth considerations as defeaters, rather than positive considerations: that is, they can weaken an existing case for the reasonableness of a demand, but they aren't sufficient to make the case on their own.

Of course, none of this shows that stealing is worse than failing to devote your life to those in need, nor that a life of (relative) luxury is indeed morally permissible. Rather, these cases are designed to illustrate the difference between reasonable and unreasonable demands. Based on where we are socially and morally, insisting on compliance seems perfectly reasonable in the one case, and far too strong in the other.

Is failing to abstain from animal flesh more like theft, or is it more like failing to devote yourself to the distant needy? Well, it's hard to see how it

undermines our shared life. There definitely isn't widespread compliance. Most don't endorse the norm against it. And while it fares reasonably well on the fourth and fifth guidelines—"Don't eat meat" is pretty straightforward as imperatives go, and it's not hard to tell when someone's having a steak—these considerations aren't enough on their own, at least if I'm right to think of them as defeaters. So, failing to abstain from animal flesh seems to be much like failing to devote yourself to the distant needy. It may be morally required, but it isn't reasonable to demand.

Where does this leave us? Recall the main argument:

1. If it would be unreasonable to demand that someone behave in a particular way, then, if she fails to behave that way, we shouldn't blame her for it.
2. It would be unreasonable to demand that someone abstain from eating meat.
3. So, if someone eats meat, we shouldn't blame her for it.

I've assumed the truth of the first premise, which I take to be plausible in its own right. In this section and the last two, I've argued for the second. If these arguments succeed, then the conclusion follows.

An Objection

At this juncture, someone might want to revisit the argument's first premise, criticizing it as follows. Surely there have been times in history when, for the sorts of reasons discussed above, it would have been unreasonable to demand that someone free his (human) slaves. Nevertheless, someone might insist, it would have been permissible—if not morally mandatory—to blame him for not doing so. Hence, reasonableness can't be the line between permissible and impermissible blame.

There are three things to say about this objection. The first is a concession in the direction of the objection: I grant that *some* resistance to slavery has always been morally permissible, and perhaps morally mandatory. However, it doesn't follow from this that the relevant form of resistance is blame. There are, of course, other means available to us: moral argumentation, pleading, humor, leading by example, non-violent protest, and so on. Unless we assume that we ought to blame people for every blameworthy action—a position I reject here—it isn't obvious to me how to make the move from resistance to blame.

The second is this. We are inclined, in hindsight, to see the actions of reformers as entirely justified. Perhaps this is evidence of a consequentialist bias

in our thinking about the behavior of historical figures. Either way, though, I think it isn't right—or, at least, isn't clearly right. It may be the case that many successful methods of moral reform are themselves morally suspect. Violent revolution may sometimes secure social change, and we should be glad for the change. But it does not follow that the violent revolution was justified. (This could be because there were other, non-violent means available. Or it might be because Kant was right about there being categorical imperatives. Surely there are other possibilities too.) So, I'm inclined to bite the bullet here. Granted, blame is a far cry from violent revolution; still, I suspect that there *were* eras in which it would have been unreasonable, and therefore wrong, to demand that someone free his slaves—unless the demander is himself the slave. (We might chalk up the counterintuitive character of this position to our moral distance from such eras.) Nevertheless—and this is crucial—slavery has always and everywhere been deeply wrong, and wherever there have been slave owners, they should have freed those they'd enslaved.

Third, we should remember that for every moral battle we fight, we ignore others. We wrong both people and animals in all sorts of ways. (For example, we're guilty of far more than *eating* animals. We wrong them by abusing them before we kill them, by testing on them, by crushing them with our cars, by paving over their habitats, by wreaking havoc on the environment that sustains them.) With this in mind, we mustn't become myopic in our moral focus. I want moral progress in a thousand areas, and I'll take it where I can get it. Insisting on one dimension of that progress is counterproductive in at least this way: it blinds us to other goods that we're in a better position to secure. I'm often surprised by how negatively people view vegetarians—as self-righteous, immature, effete, insufficiently concerned with human suffering. Moral argumentation tends to require moral authority, and it's a mistake to sacrifice it unnecessarily.⁷ We are many, many years away from the day when our society will see meat-eating as calling for blame. Until then, I see no reason to lose the other battles—for human and nonhuman animals alike—that we might still win.

Conclusion

If the arguments against meat-eating are successful, then we can't justify significant costs to others with insignificant benefits to ourselves; but since so many of our decisions involve such a tradeoff, so many of them are morally

7. For that very reason, vegetarians shouldn't compromise their vegetarianism for the sake of public perception.

wrong. However, if much of what we do is morally wrong, then it would be unreasonable to demand that people make every moral change that's required of them, and it would be arbitrary to insist on any one—at least without explanation. This shifts the burden of proof; we now need an argument for demanding compliance with the “Don't eat meat” norm. However, the arguments available seem to apply just as well to a host of other norms. Moreover, when we take stock of the considerations relevant to when a moral demand is reasonable, we see that insisting on abstinence from meat-eating doesn't fare so well. But if it would be unreasonable to demand that someone behave in a particular way, then we shouldn't blame her for failing to behave in that way. So, if someone eats meat, we shouldn't blame her for it.

Before wrapping up, let's return to the passage at the beginning of this chapter, drawn from the original preface to Singer's *Animal Liberation*. When Singer says he hopes that, after reading his work, we will experience “emotions of anger and outrage,” he doesn't say how he hopes we'll direct those emotions. Given the rhetoric he employs—comparing speciesism to racism and sexism and pointing to the parallels between our treatment of animals and human slavery—it's not unreasonable to think that he expects some of this anger to be directed toward those who perpetuate a system in which so many animals are anything but free. If this reading is correct, then the argument I've made puts me at odds with him.

It does seem to me that anger has its place. And if we keep reading, I think we find another way to read the passage that's compatible with the conclusion I've defended. Singer says that he hopes these strong emotions will be “coupled with a determination to do something about the practices described.” Perhaps Singer is thinking of anger as a force that can motivate us, as something that compels us to address injustice. Anger need not be directed at persons to accomplish this, but at the world as we find it, full of ugly realities and the mechanisms that protect them. This frustration can drive us to be agents of change—not by blaming individuals, but by working to dismantle the structures that support mindless cruelty. (This is, perhaps, the difference between vegan street activism and legislative reform.) So I can, I think, affirm Singer's hope for anger and outrage, albeit not toward those who eat meat.⁸

8. Thanks to Craig Hanks for encouraging me to develop the idea behind this chapter. For helpful conversations and feedback on drafts, thanks to Ben Bramble, Brian Coffey, Jeff Gordon, Jeff Johnson, Robert Jones, Rima Kapitan, Howard Nye, and Burkey Ozturk.

References

- Adams, Carol. 2010. *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory, 20th Anniversary Edition*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Barnard, Neal, and Kristine Kieswer. 2004. "Vegetarianism: The Healthy Alternative." In *Food for Thought: The Debate over Eating Meat*, ed. Stephen F. Sapontzis, 46–56. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Curnutt, Jordan. 1997. "A New Argument for Vegetarianism." *Journal of Social Philosophy* 28 (3): 153–172.
- Degrazia, David. 2009. "Moral Vegetarianism from a Very Broad Basis." *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 6 (2): 143–165.
- Engel, Mylan. 2001. "The Mere Considerability of Animals." *Acta Analytica* 16: 89–107.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind. 2000. *Ethics, Humans, and Other Animals: An Introduction with Readings*. London: Routledge.
- Hursthouse, Rosalind. 2011. "Virtue Ethics and the Treatment of Animals." In *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Jordan, Jeff. 2001. "Why Friends Shouldn't Let Friends Be Eaten: An Argument for Vegetarianism." *Social Theory and Practice* 27 (2): 309–322.
- Kagan, Shelly. 1989. *The Limits of Morality*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Kriegel, Uriah. 2013. "Animal Rights: A Non-Consequentialist Approach." In *Philosophical Perspectives on Animals*, ed. K. Petrus and M. Wild, 231–247. Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript.
- Midgley, Mary. 1984. *Animals and Why They Matter*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Nobis, Nathan. 2002. "Vegetarianism and Virtue." *Social Theory and Practice* 28 (1): 135–156.
- Norcross, Alastair. 2004. "Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases." *Philosophical Perspectives* 18 (1): 229–245.
- Pybus, Elizabeth M. 1982. "Saints and Heroes." *Philosophy* 57 (220): 193–199.
- Rachels, James. 1977. "Vegetarianism and 'The Other Weight Problem,'" in *World Hunger and Moral Obligation*, ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette, 180–193. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Rachels, James. 2004. "The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism." In *Food for Thought: The Debate over Eating Meat*, ed. S.F. Sapontzis, 70–80. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Regan, Tom. 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (3): 229–243.
- Singer, Peter. 2009. *Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement*. New York: Harper Perennial.

- Unger, Peter K. 1996. *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Urmson, J. O. 1958. "Saints and Heroes." In *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, ed. A. I. Melden, 198–216. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
- Walker, R. 2007. "Animal Flourishing: What Virtue Requires of Human Animals." In *Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems*, ed. Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe, 173–189. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Watson, Gary. 2004. "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme." In *Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays*, 219–259. New York: Oxford University Press.